Author of "a sweeping, non-partisan and non-polemical history of the interplay between domestic and foreign policy over the past 60 years" entitled Arsenal of Democrcy: etc., Dr. Julien Zelizer presented an authorial review focusing on one highly revealing and disturbing chapter in the long history of this national issue with relevance as timely as today's headlines. Reading extensively from the text of the just-released Basic Books publication, he elaborated on those few presidents who had success against the overwhelming political pressures on their national security policies, but saved the meat of his comments for the unsuccessful efforts of LBJ to counter the multi-tenacled political beast that squeezed his legacy thin and pale.

Not nearly as charming a speaker as his very youthful mother Vivien, whom we heard several months ago discussing the relationships between money and our intimate lives, Zelizer did weave a spell-binding narrative of how tenuous any president's grasp of what he should do can grow to be. Speaking in a radio address—not "a fireside chat"—on 1/29/40, FDR told the 3/4th of the population listening that National Security had become a paramount issue for the nation— even though the last invasion by foreign soldiers was in 1812. FDR projected the buildup of an arsenal of weaponry—immediately intended for his Lend-Lease policy—ready for full war effort when necessary: thus, the National Security State was born, along with budgets of trillions to maintain the Arsenal. And with it was the question which still haunts us: IS a sound policy possible? Can our political culture meet the challenge of creating an insulated inside group making effective policy decisions outside the exigencies of the electoral process?

Although nostalgia for a unified foreign policy—in which "politics stops at the water's edge"—always plays with us, Zelizer asserts that such an ideal bi-par-tisan approach never existed, except in the many myths of our national history, There is always the pressure of the major issues:
1) Who's the "top dog" in the never-ending struggle for control between the White House and Congress?;
2) Which party is more trust-worthy in "protecting" America?;
3) How big should government be allowed to grow to protect the Home front?;
4) Shall the predominant ideology support uni- or multi- lateralism in Foreign Affairs?

If today we think that transparency in governing is a high goal, what might we have given to know firsthand the pressures upon LBJ in his great crises. [It makes the idea of having miniature microphones imbedded and operating 24/7 in the skin of all leaders—maybe even down to the municipal level—and transcripts of their dealings made public daily not as radical an idea as it might seem to be.] Why ultimately did LBJ escalate the action in Southeast Asia? Zelizer traces the post WW2 Republican stratagies: much more aggressive about foreign policy than they had been during the 1930s buildup and, of course, during the war itself. Seeing the political hay to be harvested in a strong anti-Communist stance, they began to unleash unremitting criticism: that the Democrats had lost China and were losing the Cold War—modifying the grand legacy of Truman's successes in the war itself. DDE won great support for his key negatives against the Dems: Corruption, Korea, Cold War.So, LBJ—as a product of the 1950's USA—reacted to keep the hounds off his back. Certainly he had "machismo" enough to counter charges of timidity, desire enough to not be accused of losing to the Commies! LBJ is depicted as fearing impeachment if he were not aggressive enough.

Also, the "domino theory" was in the forefront of his thinking, as was his distaste for using nuclear weapons. He withstood Republican calls for such weapons in the face of possibly dragging China into battle. Zelizer, as all historians, is a raconteur fascinated with the details—the devilish details. He takes us into the inner circle to relate the political maneuvering of the '64 election and LBJ's inveterate great anxiety over poll numbers, even after his landslide win. He explains the isolation that Hubert Huumphrey experienced in the administration after the VP's urging withdrawal from "Nam." The loss of the White House in 1968 and the national travails that followed even to this day were the grapes of that particular harvest. And the ramifications of the expense of maintaining an anti-Communist National Security posture thru the years infringed upon LBJ's dream for society—with Medicare and the Civil Rights offense the first ramparts stormed in that War For a Great Society.

What Zelizer has given is a chilling picture of the complex creations and mutations of national security policies—without even beginning to discuss the military-industrial conspiracy. He shows the dangers and benefits of the different political pressures—Electoral, Partisan, Ideological, and Institutional— that twist and fracture the fabric, personally strong or weak as they may be, of the men guarding the Arsenal of Democracy. One wonders about the "damned worst mess"—Richard Russell's (GA Sen.-D) description of Southeast Asia in his belief that nothing was at stake there for the US. Is it an apt phrase for the whole of 60 years' worth of National Security for a nation which last was invaded by foreign soldiers in 1812? And whose leaders from the death of JFK on had never been under fire in combat, as had DDE and Harry Truman—with the exception of George Bush the Elder? Maybe it's time to renew the tradition of individual combat—a la Hector and Achilles—in Foreign affairs.

Think Biden and Cheney!!!

© 2010 Don Sheasley

Date:February 18, 2010
Speaker: Prof. Christopher Chyba. Woodrow Wilson School & Astrophysics Dept., Princeton U
Topic: What's happening now in Strategic Arms Control?
Introduced by: Eric Rau

Prof. Chyba confessed that he is unable to answer the question posed by the title because: The Arms Control treaty expired in January and negotiations are ongoing; Review of Nuclear Posture report has been postponed to March 1; and the Space Policy Review is also delayed. Therefore he offered a framework for understanding the outcomes when they are announced.

Arms Control vs. Disarmament. Arms control agreements are the means toward the goal of disarmament and verification is the key element in control. Effective verification is the ability to detect a militarily significant violation in time to respond effectively to deny the violator the benefit of the violation. However, some control treaties are not verifiable at all.

Areas of Control Treaties. Three WMD were diagramed as the points of a triangle connected by double headed arrows: Nuclear, Space, Biological/Chemical. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was negotiated when only 5 countries had nuclear weapons: US, UK, Russia, France and China. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea now have nuclear capability and are required to undergo inspection by the IAEA. Nuclear power was a difficult thing to conceal because of the industrial requirements of processing uranium but now 5,000 centrifuges can be contained in a normal warehouse type of structure.

rThere is a chemical convention prohibiting bulk production but Iraq violated it. For biological weapons there are no adequate verification methods available.

Monitoring and Control of WMD. The UN Security Council defines WMD as atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future with characteristics comparable in destructive effect to an atomic bomb. The US has a looser definition including regular bombs.

Prof. Chyba proposed a control continuum anchored by nuclear weapons as the most controllable and stretching out indefinitely to chemical/ biological and cyber weapons where monitoring is difficult or impossible and no treaty will work. Moreover, rapid technological advances make potential biological and cyber weapons possible in increasing variety and threat. Infectious and parasitic diseases are the major cause of death worldwide. Although smallpox has been eliminated, and polio may be next, it is now possible to synthesize viruses in the laboratory and the ability to manipulate genes increases daily. With respect to cyber weapons, any high school hacker can create a virus. The potential for mass destruction of cyber attack on programs that control other programs or machines is perhaps the greatest threat of the future.

©2010 Edith Neimark